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[1313] 
Climate Change Regulation, Preemption, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause 
TYLER RUNSTEN† 
As climate change regulation from the federal level becomes increasingly unlikely, states and 
local governments emerge as the last stand against climate change in the United States. This 
tension ushers in questions of separation of powers and federalism, with which the courts have 
wrestled since the country’s founding. The doctrine of preemption is one of the federal 
government’s strongest tools to limit states’ authority to regulate climate change. Preemption 
challenges have been increasing lately and have largely succeeded under judicial deference to 
the executive branch. However, recent changes to the Supreme Court signal that the Court may 
be less willing to grant to the executive branch the same deference that it once gave. There may 
now be more of an opportunity for legislators to enact regulation at the state and local level. 
If preemption is out of the question, there are other constitutional considerations that state and 
local lawmakers should keep in mind, most notably the dormant Commerce Clause. States such 
as California and Oregon, in their regulation of carbon emissions from automobiles, have already 
faced these challenges. But if preemption claims become less successful, dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges will likely increase. Recent Ninth Circuit decisions shed light on what state 
legislatures should consider when enacting similar environmentally protective statutes. 
Specifically, the principles of extraterritoriality and virtual representation guide how a state 
should frame its regulatory program. 
  
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Articles Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. The Author would like to thank Professor Takacs for his invaluable feedback, support, 
and incredibly generous time commitment, and the entire staff of the Hastings Law Journal, especially the Notes 
Team, for the insightful comments and support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has stated that human 
activities are affecting the Earth’s energy budget by changing emissions and 
atmospheric concentrations of important gases and by changing land surface 
properties.1 The result is, to name a few, rising greenhouse gas concentrations, 
increased global temperature, extreme weather and climate events, sea level rise, 
ocean acidification, and diminishing sea ice.2 If humanity continues to pollute 
and release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at this rate, the Earth will reach 
a “point of no return,” whereby a reduction is ineffective in halting climate 
change.3 A call for immediate action to avoid reaching this point has erupted 
across the globe. Within the United States, the fight against anthropogenic 
climate change has incited arguments among industries, activists, and 
governments.4  
Some argue that climate change regulation from the federal level—as 
opposed to the state level—is preferable. 5  One reason is that the federal 
government is in a unique position to prevent the migration of pollution across 
state lines.6 Another reason is the so-called “race-to-the-bottom” theory, where 
 
 1. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 121 (Thomas F. 
Stocker et al. eds., 2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_all_final.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013]; see also IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf; 1 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE 
SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 35 (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017), 
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf (“[I]t is extremely likely that 
human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”); Scientific 
Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/ 
scientific-consensus/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (providing support for scientific certainty of anthropogenic 
climate change). 
 2. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, supra note 1, at 121–37; see also NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, ADVANCING 
THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 27–28 (2010), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12782; Climate 
Change Indicators in the United States, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2021); The Causes of Climate Change, NASA: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (explaining that humans expand “‘greenhouse 
effect’—warming that results when the atmosphere traps heat radiating from Earth toward space” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 3. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING EARTH’S DEEP PAST: LESSONS FOR OUR CLIMATE FUTURE 
63–64 (2011); see also Timothy M. Lenton & Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Commentary, Tipping the Scales, 1 
NATURE REPS. CLIMATE CHANGE 97, 97 (2007) (explaining that the “tipping point” occurs when a small change 
in forcing triggers a response resulting in a qualitative change to the future state). 
 4. For an overview of “cooperative federalism” and the history of the interaction between federal and 
state government regarding environmental regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future 
of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 381–88 (2005). 
 5. See Patrick Zomer, Note, The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 60, 95–99 (2010) (arguing that the federal government needs to be the 
one to enact legislation which combats climate change after a comparative analysis of two states’ attempts 
similar to California’s). 
 6. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2007). 
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the fear is that each individual state will regulate at the lowest possible 
environmental standard in order to attract industry to that state. 7  Thus, a 
nationalized standard prevents the incentive for states to decrease or even 
eliminate environmentally protective regulation. Another goal is to standardize 
regulations across the entire country—the rationale being that industries have 
expressed difficulty in complying with a variety of regulations from all the 
different jurisdictions in which the industry operates.8  
However, the likelihood of federal regulation seems to be decreasing.9 As 
the political climate in the United States continues to polarize, chronic 
congressional inaction persists.10  Executive action taken in favor of climate 
change regulation has been dismantled upon the next administration’s induction 
into office.11 The Trump Administration seemed especially inclined to dismantle 
the federal protections enacted by predecessors.12  
As federal inaction becomes more and more unreliable, states and local 
governments have stepped in.13 In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) under the Trump Administration clearly signaled a desire to shift 
environmental regulation back to the states.14 Today, most states have renewable 
energy portfolio standards, which are policies intended to increase production of 
renewable energy.15 For example, Minnesota plans to reduce greenhouse gas 
 
 7. Id.; see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1551–52 (2007). 
 8. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 1551, 1570. 
 9. See George Cahlink, Trump Proposes Deep Energy, Environmental Cuts, E&E NEWS: BUDGET (Feb. 
10, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1062316287 (highlighting the Trump Administration’s restructuring 
of the national budget in which “EPA would be reduced by 27%, the Army Corps of Engineers would drop 22% 
and the Interior Department would fall by 13%.”).  
 10. For an overview of the attacks against the EPA during the Obama Administration, see Brigham Daniels, 
Addressing Climate Change in an Age of Political Climate Change, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1899 (2011). The Trump 
Administration and the Republican-controlled Senate in the past decade have done quite a bit to dismantle 
climate change policy that existed at the beginning of its term. See infra note 12. 
 11. A Running List of How President Trump Is Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment (May 3, 
2019). 
 12. One decision by President Trump that garnered the most attention was his withdrawal from the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement. See Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, On the U.S. 
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-
the-paris-agreement/index.html. The United States has since rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, with 
President Biden signing an executive order to rejoin only hours after his inauguration. H.J. Mai, U.S. Officially 
Rejoins Paris Agreement on Climate Change, NPR (Feb. 19, 2021, 10:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/ 
02/19/969387323/u-s-officially-rejoins-paris-agreement-on-climate-change. 
 13. State Climate Policy Map, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/state-
climate-policy/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, States Aren’t Waiting for the Trump 
Administration on Environmental Protections, WASH. POST (May 19, 2019, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/states-arent-waiting-for-the-trump-administration-
on-environmental-protections/2019/05/19/5dc853fc-7722-11e9-b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html. 
 14. David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Federalism and the Trump Presidency: A 
Preliminary Assessment, 48 PUBLIUS 345, 347 (2018). 
 15. See Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=4850. 
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emissions by 30% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels and by 80% by 2050.16 In 
an ambitious goal, California plans to be carbon neutral by 2045.17 Over 1,000 
mayors across the country have joined the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate 
Protection Agreement, “vowing to reduce carbon emissions in their cities below 
1990 levels, in line with the Kyoto Protocol.”18 
Unsurprisingly, many of these state and local regulations have faced a host 
of legal challenges from parties—including industries and the federal 
government itself—that have been impacted by the national desire to divest from 
fossil fuel consumption. This Note addresses the obstacles state and local 
lawmakers face when enacting environmentally protective regulations and 
provides important considerations under current jurisprudence. This Note’s 
analysis is twofold. First, this Note argues that the recent changes to the U.S. 
Supreme Court will likely lead to the decrease in one main constitutional 
challenge—the doctrine of preemption. Second, because of that change, state 
and local lawmakers should consider extraterritoriality and virtual 
representation when drafting climate change legislation to avoid potential 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Assertions of federal preemption, particularly through the administrative 
rulemaking process, have been very effective.19 In the past, courts have largely 
deferred to the executive branch when it asserts federal preemption.20 However, 
as discussed below, recent changes to the Supreme Court have put the future of 
deference to the executive branch, such as the Chevron, BrandX, and non-
delegation doctrines, in jeopardy. Justice Thomas has written that such doctrines 
have brought the court “to the precipice of administrative absolutism.”21 
While the future of executive deference is on shaky ground, the risk of a 
court overturning a state or local law on preemption grounds may well become 
less likely. Therefore, state and local governments should take this opportunity 
to enact their own environmentally protective legislation in the likely event that 
the Court will reject the federal government’s assertion that a less protective 
federal statute preempts state and local law. In doing so, there are still a few 
factors which must be taken into consideration. Particularly, state lawmakers 
should be wary of the other sword challengers to climate change regulations 
often wield—the dormant Commerce Clause. Because of California’s 
contentious climate change history and Oregon’s newly similar path, recent 
 
 16. MINN. STAT. § 216H.02 subd. 1 (2021). 
 17. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11, 399.15, 399.30, 454.53 (West 2021). 
 18. Mayors Climate Protection Center, U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.usmayors.org/mayors-climate-protection-center/. 
 19. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926–28 
(2008). 
 20. Id. at 927. 
 21. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 695 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Ninth Circuit decisions addressing these two states’ programs provide some 
guidance as to what lawmakers should keep in mind.22 
Part I of this Note will discuss the doctrine of preemption and how it has 
been used to invalidate state climate change regulation. Part II will address how 
deference to the executive branch has played a crucial role in the success of 
preemption challenges to state regulations. It will also analyze how recent 
changes to the Supreme Court suggest that this type of deference is unlikely to 
continue with the same strength it once had. Part III will discuss current dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and explain why these challenges should be 
accounted for when drafting state regulation. Finally, Part IV will explain the 
lessons that states should take from these challenges and additional 
considerations states should examine when enacting climate change legislation. 
There are two important lessons. First, it is critical for states to make abundantly 
clear that the purpose of its program is to protect its own resources from the 
adverse effects of climate change. Second, the program should equally affect the 
interests of both in-state and out-of-state firms. 
I.  PREEMPTION AND PREEMPTION CHALLENGES IN COURT 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that the 
laws of the federal government shall reign supreme over state and local laws.23 
Although the Constitution vests in the federal government exclusive power in 
certain areas, the states also retain authority over most of the same areas.24 
Grounded in the Supremacy Clause, the doctrine of preemption allows the 
federal government to displace—or preempt—such state and local law in a 
number of ways. “Express” preemption occurs when Congress states such 
preemption in express terms in the statute itself.25 Although these express terms 
grant authority to displace state and local regulation in that area, the Supreme 
Court has encouraged narrowly construing express preemption provisions.26 
This is especially true when they concern states’ traditional authority to regulate 
health, safety, and welfare.27 Moreover, even if there is an express preemption 
 
 22. See infra Part IV.B. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 24. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000).  
 25. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 
(1983); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (2018) (providing the express preemption provision in the Consumer 
Protection Safety Act by stating “no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to 
establish or to continue in effect any provision”); 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (2018) (providing the express preemption 
provision in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act by stating “a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or 
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter”). 
 26. Nelson, supra note 24, at 227. 
 27. See Amelia Raether, Note, Commandeering, Preemption, and Vehicle Emissions Regulation Post-
Murphy v. NCAA, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1027 (2020) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 
518 (1992)). 
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provision, statutes may contain a “savings clause,” which signals Congress’s 
intent to reserve for the states the right to regulate in that area.28 
When an express preemption provision is absent from a federal statute, 
courts may still find that a state or local law is impliedly preempted in one of 
two ways. First, a court may find “field” preemption. Field preemption exists 
when Congress’s intent to supersede state law may be inferred because the 
“scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”29  
“[T]he Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of 
state laws on the same subject,” or because “the object sought to be obtained 
by federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the 
same purpose.”30 
In other words, a local government cannot regulate in a field which the federal 
program is so pervasive so as to retain control over that entire field.31 
Second, “conflict” preemption exists when “compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”32 or when the state law “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”33 In other words, conflict—also known as “obstacle”—
preemption exists where the state and federal laws contradict one another or 
when the state or local law obstructs the purposes of the federal law.34 
Such preemptive federal regulatory schemes can also take a couple 
different characteristics. Some are regarded as a “floor,” where the federal 
statute sets a minimum level and states are free to regulate above that level.35 
For example, in the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) is directed to establish a minimum pollutant level and states are free to 
regulate at a higher standard.36 Conversely, the federal scheme may be deemed 
 
 28. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2018) (“A 
State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to 
the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.”); Frank R. Lautenberg 
Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 2617(e)(1) (2018) (providing that states may regulate 
chemical substances with certain limitations).  
 29. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 30. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 31. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403 (2012). 
 32. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 34. Nelson, supra note 24, at 228–29. 
 35. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 1551 (explaining that a regulatory floor is “where federal law allows states to 
increase the stringency of regulation but prohibits more lenient state regulation”). 
 36. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(o)(3), 1370 (2018). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 is 
another example. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2018) (providing states with the authority to impose solid waste disposal 
requirements more stringent than the federal standard). 
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a “ceiling,” which establishes a maximum.37 In this regulatory framework, states 
are free to regulate below that maximum but cannot regulate at a higher 
standard. 38  Ceiling preemption is common in the drug industry, where the 
federal standard is particularly important so that companies need only comply 
with one standard.39 
Preemption in the climate change context is governed by American Electric 
Power Company v. Connecticut, where the Supreme Court considered 
congressional displacement of federal, not state, law.40 In this context, although 
it is a different issue than preemption of state and local law, the Court again 
stressed the importance of clear guidance from Congress. 41  Addressing 
plaintiffs’ argument that defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions violated the 
federal common law of interstate nuisance, the Court held that “the Clean Air 
Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired 
powerplants.”42 Relying on Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, which found that 
federal common law is displaced when the statute “speak[s] directly to [the] 
question,” the Court found the Clean Air Act spoke directly to the question of 
carbon dioxide emissions.43 Therefore, the Clean Air Act, and thus EPA actions 
authorized under the Act, preempted plaintiffs’ federal common law claim of 
interstate nuisance.44 The Court noted that the Clean Air Act contained several 
avenues of enforcement, such as criminal penalties and private civil suits.45 It 
found that this was the same relief sought through federal common law, and 
there was “no room for a parallel track.”46  Notably, the Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that federal common law is not displaced until the EPA 
exercises its authority, for example, when it establishes standards through 
rulemaking.47 It stressed the importance of Congress’s decision to occupy the 
entire field rather than allowing the agency to decide to occupy the entire field.48 
Although preemption normally comes legislatively, in recent years federal 
executive agencies have invoked the doctrine of preemption to supplant state 
 
 37. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 1552, 1568–69 (explaining that a ceiling is where “federal action would 
preclude any more protective legal requirements or incentives created by other actors, be they state political 
actors or even common law regimes”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 1552–53, 1572–73.  
 40. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418 (2011). 
 41. See id. at 426. 
 42. Id. at 418, 424. 
 43. Id. at 424 (alterations in original) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 
(1978)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 425 (citing EPA authority to delegate enforcement, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1), (d)(1); possibility of 
criminal penalties, 42 U.S.C. § 7411; and citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 425–26. 
 48. Id. at 426. 
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and local environmental regulation on their own accord.49 This shift has been 
met with speculation.50 In August 1999, President Bill Clinton issued Executive 
Order 13132, which outlined requirements agencies must consider when taking 
action that preempts state law.51 In May 2009, President Barack Obama issued 
a presidential memorandum, which directed agencies to follow strict guidelines 
when asserting preemptive power through administrative rulemaking. 52 
Specifically, the memorandum indicated that “preemption of State law by 
executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full 
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient 
legal basis for preemption.”53 However, compliance with these directions have 
been inconsistent and often difficult to enforce across administrations.54 
Since this shift, the federal government has become increasingly aggressive 
in asserting that federal environmental laws preempt state law.55 For example, 
in July 2019, the Washington state senate enacted a law which prohibited 
importation of “crude oil into or from a rail tank car unless the oil has a vapor 
pressure of less than nine pounds per square inch.”56 North Dakota and Montana 
are currently seeking administrative determination that the federal Hazardous 
Material Transportation Act (HMTA) preempts Washington’s law.57 The Public 
Notice and Invitation of Comment states that the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Department of 
Transportation have the authority to preempt under the HMTA.58 The future of 
this type of agency action is uncertain and likely to be challenged. 
The Clean Air Act’s contentious history, which continues today, 
illuminates the constant struggle between the federal and state governments and 
among successive presidential administrations. The Clean Air Act contains an 
express preemption provision prohibiting the states from regulating at a different 
level from the federal standard.59 Under the statute, California is the only state 
that may invoke a “waiver,” which allows it to establish a more stringent 
 
 49. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 697–98 
(2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. § 206 (2000). 
 52. Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (May 20, 2009).  
 53. Id.  
 54. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 531–70 (2012). 
 55. Heinzerling, supra note 19, at 927; see also Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 52, at 1 (“In 
recent years . . . executive departments and agencies have sometimes announced that their regulations preempt 
State law, including State common law, without explicit preemption by the Congress or an otherwise sufficient 
basis under applicable legal principles.”). 
 56. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.56.580(1)(a) (2021). 
 57. Hazardous Materials: The State of Washington Crude Oil by Rail—Vapor Pressure Requirements, 84 
Fed. Reg. 35,707, 35,707 (July 24, 2019); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–28 (2018). 
 58.  Hazardous Materials: The State of Washington Crude Oil by Rail—Vapor Pressure Requirements, 84 
Fed. Reg. at 35,708.  
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2018). 
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emissions standard.60 If California does this, other states may elect to follow 
either the California or the federal standard. 61  In 2009, under the Obama 
Administration, the EPA granted California’s waiver. 62  A decade later, in 
September 2019, under the Trump Administration, the EPA and NHTSA jointly 
published in the Federal Register the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) 
Vehicles Rule, which proposed to amend greenhouse gas and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.63 The SAFE Rule also proposed to withdraw 
the waiver under section 209 of the Clean Air Act, and to establish national fuel 
economy standards, specifically preempting state programs.64 This withdrawal 
would put California’s Zero-Emission Vehicle mandate in jeopardy as 
potentially preempted by the SAFE Rule.65 One study showed that if the SAFE 
Rule goes into effect, oil consumption would increase by 320 billion gallons, 
greenhouse-gas emissions would increase by the equivalent of two years of 
emissions from the entire transportation sector, auto safety would decrease, and 
Americans would lose $460 billion of the expected $660 billion in savings from 
the current fuel-economy standards.66 For these reasons, California and twenty-
two other states have filed suit to challenge this proposed rule.67 In his first day 
in office, President Biden issued an executive order directing the agencies to 
immediately review environmental actions under the Trump Administration, 
including the SAFE Rule.68 
In these examples, the executive branch decides that a duly enacted federal 
statute preempts state law through administrative rulemaking. Other agencies do 
 
 60. See id. §§ 7543(b)–(e), 7507. 
 61. See id. 
 62. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of 
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
 63. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 51,310, 51,310–11 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533). 
 64. Id. at 51,311–14.  
 65. Peter Whitfield & Aaron L. Flyer, SAFE Rule: Federal-State Tension in Auto Emission Regulation, 51 
TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2020, at 4, 6. 
 66. CHRIS HARTO, SHANNON BAKER-BRANSTETTER & JAMIE HALL, THE UN-SAFE RULE: HOW A FUEL-
ECONOMY ROLLBACK COSTS AMERICANS BILLIONS IN FUEL SAVINGS AND DOES NOT IMPROVE SAFETY 2–3 
(2019), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-Un-SAFE-Rule-How-a-Fuel-
Economy-Rollback-Costs-Americans-Billions-in-Fuel-Savings-and-Does-Not-Improve-Safety-2.pdf. 
 67. Press Release, State of Cal., Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Becerra Files Lawsuit Challenging Trump 
Administration’s Attempt to Trample California’s Authority to Maintain Longstanding Clean Car Standards 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-files-lawsuit-challenging-
trump-administration%E2%80%99s. The content and validity of those challenges are beyond the scope of this 
Note. For a summary and discussion of the legal issues, see Trish McCubbin, The Trump Administration’s 
Withdrawal of California’s Clean Air Act Preemption Waiver in the SAFE Rule, 51 TRENDS,  Mar.–Apr. 2020, 
at 4, 6–7. It should also be noted that many expect the Biden Administration to reverse the SAFE Rule. Cynthia 
A. Faur, Marian LaLonde, George Marek & Pilar M. Thomas, What to Expect from the Biden Administration: 
Key Environmental and Natural Resource Issues to Watch, QUARLES & BRADY LLP (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://www.quarles.com/publications/what-to-expect-from-the-biden-administration-key-environmental-and-
natural-resource-issues-to-watch/. 
 68. Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7037–38 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
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this as well. 69  Perhaps the most widely known is the Food and Drug 
Administration’s assertion of preemption over state law.70 Some agencies even 
assert that their regulation, promulgated in the Federal Register, supplants 
common law. 71  Under several doctrines of executive deference—discussed 
below—courts have largely deferred to the agency’s decision that its program 
preempts state and local law.72 This deference is likely the main reason for the 
increase in assertions of preemption by the executive branch.73 The next Part 
will discuss how the future of this type of executive deference is standing on 
shaky ground. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE  
BRANCH’S ASSERTIONS OF PREEMPTION 
The Supreme Court’s deference to the executive branch, specifically when 
it comes to assertions of preemption, is likely to change in the near future in light 
of the current Justices expressing distaste for such deference. Several doctrines 
developed over the years—namely, Chevron, Auer, and BrandX—have granted 
very permissive decisionmaking authority to administrative agencies. For a 
variety of reasons discussed below, current Justices have signaled their dislike 
for how these doctrines have progressed and have called for reconsideration. 
This Part will briefly explain these doctrines, address how they have inhibited 
local climate change regulation, and highlight specific comments made by 
current Justices signaling their impending demise. 
A. OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE DEFERENCE 
Over time, the federal rulemaking process has been developed to allow the 
executive and legislative branches to work in tandem.74 When Congress passes 
a statute which either requires or authorizes an executive agency to issue 
regulations, the agency may do so through a process which involves proposed 
rules, public comments, review, and publication of the final rule.75 As previously 
noted, executive agencies have become increasingly aggressive in using this 
 
 69. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt 
Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 462 (2008); see also Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open 
Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496–97 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633). 
 70. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 69, at 462–63.  
 71. See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201, 314, 601). 
In Riegel v. MedTronic, the Supreme Court held that the FDCA expressly preempted state tort failure to warn 
claims. Although the Supreme Court discussed that it did not need to defer to the agency’s position because the 
statutory language was clear, it noted that the FDA did agree with its position. Riegel v. MedTronic, 552 U.S. 
312, 321, 330 (2008).  
 72. See infra Part III. 
 73. See Mendelson, supra note 49, at 697–98.  
 74. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN 
OVERVIEW (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32240.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 2–3. 
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tactic to preempt and displace a state or local government’s attempt to regulate 
in the same area, particularly in the area of environmental regulation.76 
After publication, the final rule may be challenged in court.77 The courts 
have developed several doctrines which have encouraged judges to defer to an 
executive agency’s expertise in a certain arena. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., for 
example, Justice Jackson stated that the “Court has long given considerable and 
in some cases decisive weight” to agency decisions.78 The rationale for this is 
that the executive agencies—with their expertise in a certain arena—are in a 
better position than the courts to make the right call with respect to their subject 
areas.79 
The most famous—some would say infamous—of these is the Chevron 
doctrine. In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court 
held that when a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue,” the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation. 80  The only 
limitation on this is that the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”81 In other words, when a 
congressionally enacted statute is ambiguous, and an executive agency 
interpreted the vague language, the court will defer to that interpretation. 
After Chevron came Auer deference, which requires a court to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own promulgated rule if found to be ambiguous, 
“unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent.’”82 This means that when an agency 
interprets a vague statute—normally through the rulemaking process—and the 
language of its own interpretation is also vague, the courts will defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of its own interpretation of the statute. 
The BrandX doctrine took this one step further. This decision, arising in 
the net neutrality context, held that the ambiguity in the applicable statute (the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996) left interpretation up to the responsible 
agency (the Federal Communications Commission).83 The practical result of the 
decision is that an agency is free to change its previous interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute so long as it provides a reasonable explanation for the new 
interpretation.84 Under BrandX, every time there is an administration change, an 
agency is free to change the previous administration’s policy.85 Critics of the 
doctrine argue that it does away with stare decisis because a court may hold an 
 
 76. Heinzerling, supra note 19, at 927. 
 77. See CAREY, supra note 74, at 6. 
 78. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 79. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 80. Id. at 843–44. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 
490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 83. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. BrandX Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996 (2005). 
 84. Heidi Marie Werntz, Counting on Chevron?, 38 ENERGY L.J. 297, 329 (2017) (citing BrandX, 545 U.S. 
at 982–85); Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 127 (2018). 
 85. For a discussion on this back-and-forth dilemma, see Nielson, supra note 84, at 86–93.  
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agency’s previous interpretation as valid.86 However, if the agency later changes 
its mind and provides a new interpretation, then the previous judicially decided 
interpretation is no longer valid.87 Thus, the executive branch supplants a court’s 
decision.88 
The non-delegation doctrine is related, yet different. The Constitution vests 
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.”89 
However, Congress may pass its constitutionally delegated authority to create 
law to an executive agency so long as it does so using an “intelligible 
principle.”90 The Supreme Court has been quite lenient with this practice, only 
having struck down two statutes for failing to provide an intelligible principle, 
both in 1935.91 Through this lenient standard, executive agencies have enjoyed 
a regulatory field day for almost a decade. Some thought that this permissive 
doctrine would come to an end in Whitman v. American Trucking.92 There, the 
Supreme Court addressed a provision of the Clean Air Act, which required the 
EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards “requisite to protect the 
public health.”93  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the word 
“requisite” was the intelligible principle, because it meant “sufficient, but not 
more than necessary.”94 Thus, the EPA was free to regulate as it pleased under 
the statutory authority granted by Congress. 
Overall, when legal challenges to federal executive action are brought, 
courts rely on the Chevron, Auer, BrandX, and non-delegation doctrines to defer 
to the agency’s expertise and largely uphold the action. As discussed below, this 
permissive precedent will likely not last much longer since enough Justices on 
the Supreme Court have expressed dislike for this permissive deference. 
B. INDICATORS OF THE LIKELY FUTURE DECREASE IN DEFERENCE TO THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ASSERTIONS OF PREEMPTION 
Current Justices on the Supreme Court have signaled their desire to revisit 
such permissive deference to administrative agencies. Although Justice Scalia 
suggested “Chevron will endure and be given its full scope . . . because it more 
accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves 
 
 86. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 694 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. See id.  
 88. See id. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
 90. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).  
 91. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935); Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 430, 432–33 (1935).  
 92. See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Fledgling Phoenix or Ill-Fated Albatross?, 
31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11151, 11151 (2001) (arguing the Supreme Court “could have declared 
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 93. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2018)).  
 94. Id. at 473. 
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its needs,” 95  recent jurisprudence suggests otherwise. Specifically, current 
members of the Supreme Court have expressed their desire to revisit deference 
to the executive branch under Chevron, BrandX, Auer, and the non-delegation 
doctrine. Although the main argument in favor of executive deference is that the 
executive branch has expertise in that area, the argument against is that the 
executive agencies lack expertise in the area of separating power between the 
federal and state governments.96 Additionally, many commenters, including the 
Justices themselves, have noted that deference to the executive branch is 
especially inappropriate in the area of climate change regulation. 
In then-Tenth Circuit Judge Gorsuch’s famous concurrence to Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch, he signaled his desire to divest power that has been granted 
to the executive branch under Chevron.97 Principally, his main concerns were 
grounded in separation of powers and judicial dereliction of duty.98 According 
to Justice Gorsuch, the Chevron doctrine permits the courts to abandon their 
constitutionally mandated duty to interpret the law.99 As such, the courts are 
abdicating their duty by allowing the executive branch to do the courts’ job.100 
In Gutierrez-Brizuela, Justice Gorsuch also foreshadowed a desire to 
revisit the non-delegation doctrine. He stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has long 
recognized that under the Constitution ‘congress cannot delegate legislative 
power to the president’ and that this ‘principle [is] universally recognized as 
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by 
the constitution.’”101 Justice Gorsuch had that opportunity in Gundy v. United 
States, but, with only a minority of votes on his side, he resorted to detailing his 
distaste in a dissenting opinion.102  To him, the framers of the Constitution 
believed it would frustrate the system of government if Congress could vaguely 
assign to others its legislative duty.103 Essentially, the vesting clauses would 
make no sense if “Congress could pass off its legislative power to the executive 
branch.” 104  He then outlined the history of the non-delegation doctrine—
including the intelligible principle standard—and called for a stricter 
 
 95. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 
(1989). 
 96. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); Mendelson, supra 
note 49, at 698. 
 97. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he fact is Chevron . . . permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and 
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 98. Id. at 1153–54. 
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declare invalid agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations in the cases and controversies that come 
before them.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
 102. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 2133. 
 104. Id. at 2134–35. 
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construction in order to avoid this constitutionally impermissible delegation of 
power from the legislative to the executive branch.105 
Specifically noteworthy in Gundy is the fact that it was just a plurality 
which disagreed with Justice Gorsuch, indicating the Court was one vote short 
of adopting Justice Gorsuch’s view and revisiting the non-delegation doctrine. 
Justice Gorsuch likely would have won had it not been for Justice Alito joining 
the plurality with hesitation.106 Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that if “a 
majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for 
the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a majority is not 
willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here 
for special treatment.”107 In other words, he would have been ready to revisit the 
non-delegation doctrine if he had enough votes to support it. 
Justice Alito will have that chance with Justice Kavanaugh now on the 
bench. Although Justice Kavanaugh had been appointed, he did not participate 
in the decision in Gundy.108 But later that term, Justice Kavanaugh noted his 
agreement with Justice Gorsuch during a discussion in a denial of certiorari.109 
He stated that Justice Gorsuch’s “opinion raised points that may warrant further 
consideration in future cases.”110 In the same term, Justice Gorsuch stated that 
the Court should “say goodbye” to Auer deference in a concurring opinion joined 
by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito. 111 
In February 2020, Justice Thomas also signaled his desire to revisit the 
Court’s deference to the executive branch. Justice Thomas wrote a strong dissent 
to the majority’s denial of certiorari on a Ninth Circuit decision which deferred 
to the IRS under BrandX.112 Justice Thomas noted, “Although I authored Brand 
X, ‘it is never too late to surrende[r] former views to a better considered 
position.’”113 In his discussion, Justice Thomas wrote that the Chevron doctrine 
precludes judges from exercising judicial power, gives federal agencies 
unconstitutional power, and undermines the Judiciary’s ability to check the other 
branches.114 Justice Thomas also noted that Chevron offends the Administrative 
Procedures Act, which the Chevron decision improperly failed to discuss.115 He 
was even more convinced that BrandX conflicted with Article III of the 
 
 105. Id. at 2135–42. 
 106. See id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 107. Id. at 2131. 
 108. Id. at 2130. 
 109. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 112. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 690 (alteration in original) (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring)).  
 114. Id. at 692. 
 115. Id. 
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Constitution because it “directs courts to give effect to the will of the Executive 
by depriving judges of the ability to follow their own precedent.”116 
Moreover, the future of executive deference in the realm of climate change 
regulation is significant because it often invokes the major questions doctrine.117 
The major questions doctrine assumes that “Congress [will] speak clearly if it 
wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political 
significance.’”118 Thus, when dealing with a question of major significance, the 
Court will not defer to the agency out of an assumption that Congress would not 
delegate to the executive branch the authority to decide it. 119  In another 
dissenting opinion, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh wrote, “[i]f an agency 
wants to exercise expansive regulatory authority over some major social or 
economic activity— . . . greenhouse gas emitters, for example—an ambiguous 
grant of statutory authority is not enough. Congress must clearly authorize an 
agency to take such a major regulatory action.”120 This is yet another indication 
that this Supreme Court prefers a clear indication of preemption from Congress, 
not the administrative agency. 
The Clean Air Act provides a clear example. In 2009, the EPA issued what 
came to be known as the Endangerment Finding, stating that “emissions of well-
mixed greenhouse gases . . . contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, 
and thus to the climate change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to 
endanger public health and welfare.”121 As a result of this finding, greenhouse 
gases were added to the list of air pollutants that the EPA was required to 
regulate under the Clean Air Act. 122  Then, in Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Endangerment Finding.123 
If the EPA promulgates a regulation holding that greenhouse gas emissions do 
not pose a danger to the environment, a challenge to that rule could come before 
the D.C. Circuit. The Chevron doctrine would require the D.C. Circuit to defer 
to the new stance. This is the executive branch forcing the judicial branch to 
overturn its own precedent and is the exact type of usurpation of constitutional 
authority of which Justice Thomas disapproves.124 
 
 116. Id. at 694–95 (“Brand X takes on the constitutional deficiencies of Chevron and exacerbates 
them. . . . Even if the Court is not willing to question Chevron itself, at the very least, we should consider taking 
a step away from the abyss by revisiting Brand X.”). 
 117. Jonathan H. Adler, Justice Kavanaugh on Delegation and Major Questions (Updated), REASON (Nov. 
25, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://reason.com/2019/11/25/justice-kavanaugh-on-delegation-and-major-questions. 
 118. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). 
 119. Marla D. Tortorice, Nondelegation and the Major Questions Doctrine: Displacing Interpretive Power, 
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 123. Coal. for Responsible Regul., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 124. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 694 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Lastly, this increasingly conservative Court poses a unique issue to the 
future of climate change regulation. Historically, conservative Courts have 
vehemently pushed for federalism, by favoring the transfer of power from the 
federal government to the state and local governments.125 This would further 
support the notion that now is the time for state and local governments to 
vigorously enact environmentally protective legislation. However, 
conservatives tend to dislike both climate change regulation and granting 
administrative agencies broad authority in the absence of clear Congressional 
direction.126 Therefore, when it comes to administrative agencies attempting to 
preempt state and local law in an effort to decrease climate change regulation, it 
is currently unclear which is the lesser of these two evils in the Justices’ eyes. 
This is especially true in light of the recent passing of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. Commentators’ fears about Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s recent 
confirmation express this exact dilemma.127 
The point is that the current Justices, if they are to adhere to their loud 
foreshadowing, will have to find a clearer indication from Congress that the 
statute explicitly allows an agency to preempt state and local law in a certain 
arena. Further, it is entirely possible that the Court will not allow an executive 
agency to preempt state law via administrative rulemaking. If the Justices wish 
to require Congress to perform its constitutionally mandated duty to create law, 
they may likely instruct Congress to issue the explicit preemption itself. If so, 
current Supreme Court precedent requires narrowly construing express 
preemption provisions.128 This simply creates a higher bar for the Court to find 
preemption outside of the rulemaking process. Only then will Justice Gorsuch, 
and those that agree with him, address their clear concern that: (1) Congress has 
been neglecting its duty to create law; (2) the courts have been in dereliction of 
their duty to say what the law is; and (3) the executive branch is free to manage 
the operations of all three branches of government. 
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If the current Supreme Court stays true to its desire to distance itself from 
deferring to executive agencies’ assertion of preemption through administrative 
rulemaking, states should exercise their authority to cooperate in environmental 
regulation. Of course, challengers to environmentally protective laws from a 
state and local level will likely wield every sword they can.129 As discussed 
below, assertions of dormant Commerce Clause violations will likely increase, 
and enacting governments should keep these potential constitutional challenges 
in mind as they proceed. 
III.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CHALLENGES 
If preemption is of no—or at least less—concern, another major concern 
for states and local governments attempting to regulate climate change on their 
own is the dormant Commerce Clause. This Part discusses the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine’s development over the years, its challenges in court, 
and how these challenges reshaped the doctrine. It also emphasizes several 
important lessons, such as the problem of virtual representation and 
extraterritoriality, which state and local law makers should examine as they 
enact environmentally protective laws. 
A. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
The Commerce Clause vests in Congress the power to regulate 
“Commerce . . . among the several States.”130 The Commerce Clause has long 
been understood to have a “negative” aspect which denies the States the power 
to discriminate against or burden interstate commerce.131 This is often called the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which prohibits “economic protectionism,” 
or “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.”132 That is, the Commerce Clause assumes 
that Congress does not want any burden on interstate commerce, and a state or 
local action that does place such a burden would be considered a constitutional 
violation under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
There are two main goals that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is 
meant to achieve. The first is to preserve the states’ right to act as laboratories, 
 
 129. For example, in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, the plaintiffs argued the California 
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(1935). 
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whereby the states may try new social and economic experiments.133 The second 
goal is to protect against “economic Balkanization,” which is defined as 
“political fragmentation,” or the separation of regulatory jurisdictions into 
smaller, individual, and often hostile bodies. 134  The Supreme Court has 
expressed that the Constitution’s drafters intended to “avoid the tendencies 
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies 
and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”135 Over the 
years, a number of Supreme Court decisions have gradually created a test that 
courts will apply when deciding whether a state or local law or regulation 
unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.136 
In the first step of the test, a court must determine whether the state or local 
law discriminates against interstate commerce.137 There are three ways in which 
a state or local law may be found discriminatory. The regulation may be facially 
discriminatory, in which the state or local action specifically discriminates 
against interstate commerce.138  For example, a state law which specifically 
prohibits importation of items from out of state is facially discriminatory.139 A 
facially neutral regulation, however, may be discriminatory based on either its 
effects140 or its purpose.141  
If the state regulation is found to be discriminatory in one of these three 
ways, the court applies the strict scrutiny test. Under this test, the discriminatory 
regulation is presumed unconstitutional unless the state can show “that it 
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”142 Only one local regulation in the 
history of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been upheld under this 
test.143 If, however, the state or local statute is found not to be discriminatory, 
the court will apply the Pike balancing test. 144  Under this test there is no 
 
 133. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments . . . .”). 
 134. Steve A. Radom, Note, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption, 39 
TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 304 (2003). 
 135. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). 
 136. Interstate commerce is the “buying, selling, or moving of products, services, or money across state 
borders.” Interstate Commerce, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/interstate-commerce-term.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 137. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978) (explaining that a state law may not 
discriminate “against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from 
their origin, to treat them differently”). 
 138. Id. at 628.  
 139. Id.  
 140. See Waste Sys. Corp. v. Cnty. of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1993). 
 141. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 352–53 (1977). 
 142. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
 143. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding a patently discriminatory law since it served a 
legitimate purpose which could not be achieved through less discriminatory means). 
 144. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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presumption of invalidity as there is under the strict scrutiny test.145 Instead, a 
non-discriminatory state or local regulation is presumed to be constitutional so 
long as the burdens on interstate commerce are not “clearly excessive” in 
relation to the local benefits.146 
The extraterritoriality principle is a corollary to the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Strictly speaking, extraterritoriality is the prohibition against state 
legislation which: (1) has the “practical effect of establishing a ‘scale of prices 
for use in other states’”;147 (2) has the practical effect of controlling conduct 
beyond the state’s boundaries; and (3) requiring an out-of-state merchant to seek 
regulatory approval in one state before undertaking a transaction in another.148 
The courts will ask whether the “practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”149 In other words, the dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from regulating conduct that “takes place 
wholly outside of the State’s borders.”150 Even when states regulate in the areas 
of public health and safety rather than economic interests, courts may still invoke 
the extraterritoriality principle if the regulation imposes requirements on out-of-
state transactions or risks conflicting regulations between the states in a way that 
would result in an undue burden on interstate commerce.151 As will be discussed 
in Part V, the extraterritoriality principle has been invoked to challenge state and 
local environmental regulations and should be considered when drafting 
legislation. 
Another corollary to the dormant Commerce Clause, and a factor that can 
decrease the likelihood of finding discrimination, is the principle of virtual 
representation.152 The virtual representation problem arises when a law burdens 
both out-of-state and in-state businesses.153 The question the courts will ask is 
whether the interests of the out-of-state firms can be adequately represented in 
the state legislative process.154 If the burdened in-state businesses can represent 
the likely similar interests of the burdened out-of-state businesses in the state 
legislature, it is unnecessary for a court to step in and protect the out-of-state 
businesses.155 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 
511, 528 (1935)).  
 148. See id. at 336–37; Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 988–89 (2013). 
 149. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986)). 
 150. Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)).  
 151. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 145 (2013). 
 152. Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting 
the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, 43 ENV’T L. 295, 307 (2013). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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However, virtual representation crumbles—and thus results in a finding of 
discrimination against interstate commerce—when something impedes the in-
state businesses from adequately and properly representing those out of state. 
The prime example of this occurred in West Lynn Creamery v. Healey, where 
the state of Massachusetts imposed a fee on all dairy producers.156 The Supreme 
Court stated, “[n]ondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue 
here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate 
commerce, in part because ‘[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely 
affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.’” 157  In other 
words, some sort of burden which applies to both in-state and out-of-state 
producers is fine since the out-of-state producers are represented by the in-state 
producers. 
The problem in West Lynn Creamery was that the fees collected from all 
producers were deposited into a fund which was distributed to only in-state 
producers.158 Although a subsidy by itself may have been perfectly acceptable, 
the combination of the two resulted in an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce.159 The Supreme Court reasoned that the state’s “political processes 
can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-
state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has been mollified 
by the subsidy.”160  This is the problem of virtual representation. If a state 
program burdens both in-state and out-of-state producers equally, then the 
program is constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. However, when 
some sort of inequality exists, such as the burden on interstate commerce in West 
Lynn Creamery which served the benefit of in-state interests but to the detriment 
of out-of-state interests, such a program is the paradigmatic violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.161 
This test guides the courts’ analysis when faced with a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to state and local regulations as allegedly burdensome on 
interstate commerce. Unsurprisingly, those unsupportive of climate change 
regulation have attacked local laws under this doctrine. The next Subpart will 
discuss a few prime examples of how these challenges have shaped out. 
B. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES AS TOOLS TO COMBAT 
STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 
Opponents to state and local climate change regulation argue that the 
regulation places an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the 
 
 156. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994). 
 157. Id. (second alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 199–200 (“By conjoining a tax and a subsidy, Massachusetts has created a program more 
dangerous to interstate commerce than either part alone.”). 
 160. Id. at 200. 
 161. Id. 
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dormant Commerce Clause. One illustrative example is the Clean Air Act. Since 
the Act’s inception, the interaction between federal and local actors has been 
replete with conflict. States often challenge federal regulations in court.162 And 
despite the federal government’s challenges to the state regulations, states do 
maintain a tremendous amount of autonomy under the Clean Air Act.163  
California specifically has a rich history with the Clean Air Act. With its 
air quality being shockingly low, it has responded by enacting some of the most 
restrictive air quality regulations in the country.164 Given the recent dramatic 
increase in wildfires, and the federal government’s clear resistance to assist, 
California has and likely will continue to do whatever it can to decrease the 
havoc that climate change-motivated wildfires have wreaked across the state.165  
Other states have followed a similar path. For example, Oregon’s efforts 
also exemplify a state’s attempt to combat climate change, only to be challenged 
in court as unconstitutional. Its wet climate has often been thought resistant to 
major effects of wildfires; however, the state’s recent and drastic increase in 
wildfires suggests that impending destruction from climate change has and will 
continue to affect not just California or the West Coast, but the entire country.166  
This Subpart will discuss dormant Commerce Clause challenges to 
California’s and Oregon’s clean air programs. As more and more states begin to 
follow suit, California’s jurisprudential history—one that has followed to 
Oregon167—serves as a proper example to illustrate considerations for states as 
they consider taking on a similar challenge. 
1. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to California’s Air Pollution 
Program 
Because other states have followed California’s approach to its battle 
against climate change, legal challenges to California’s program reveal the 
points of contention that other states must examine. In 2006, the California 
Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 32 (A.B. 32), which directed the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) to ensure California reached 1990 greenhouse gas 
 
 162. For a list of decisions which address state challenges to federal regulations in court, see Jonathan H. 
Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and 
Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 672 n.2 (2016). 
 163. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1190–
93 (1995). 
 164. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–99 
(West 2021).  
 165. See Colby Bermel, Carla Marinucci & Alex Guillén, Newsom Bans New Gas Cars—and Begs Trump 
for a Fight, POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/09/23/ 
newsom-bans-new-gas-cars-and-begs-trump-for-a-fight-1317947. 
 166. See Christopher Flavelle & Henry Fountain, In Oregon, a New Climate Menace: Fires Raging Where 
They Don’t Usually Burn, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/climate/oregon-wildfires.html 
(Sept. 17, 2020). 
 167. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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emissions levels by 2020.168 Later, Assembly Bill 1493 (A.B. 1493) directed 
CARB to enact regulations which “achieve the maximum feasible and cost-
effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.”169 In 
2009, CARB enacted the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), which was 
“designed to encourage the use of cleaner low-carbon transportation fuels in 
California.” 170  The LCFS standards are measured in terms of the Carbon 
Intensity (CI) score, which calculates the greenhouse gas emissions throughout 
the fuel’s lifecycle.171 The LCFS program also creates a credit market because 
suppliers generate credits for exceeding the CI reduction required that year.172 
Suppliers then trade the credits with other suppliers in the market.173 A.B. 1493 
was enacted under the special Clean Air Act provision which preempts all states 
other than California from regulating mobile source emissions.174  
Rather than sticking with simple tailpipe emissions, CARB regulates 
emissions via a “fuel pathway” calculator, which consists of the sum of the 
greenhouse gases emitted throughout the fuel’s lifecycle, including production, 
refining, and transportation.175 Since the calculation takes transportation into 
consideration, it can assign a higher CI score to fuels transferred from greater 
distances. 
Because of California’s large economy and importance in the energy 
industry, it is no surprise that this ambitious goal has come under attack.176 In 
Rocky Mountain I, several plaintiffs challenged the LCFS as violative of the 
dormant Commerce Clause for placing an improper burden on interstate 
commerce. The district court found that the LCFS facially discriminated against 
out-of-state commerce, applied the strict scrutiny test, and held it violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause.177  
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no facial discrimination.178 The court 
reasoned that the dormant Commerce Clause normally does not allow for 
distinctions which benefit in-state producers based on state boundaries alone.179 
 
 168. A.B. 32, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (enacted). Although facing challenges from car and 
truck transportation, California reached its 2020 goal four years early. Tony Barboza & Julian H. Lange, 
California Hit Its Climate Goal Early—But Its Biggest Source of Pollution Keeps Rising, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 
2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-adv-california-climate-pollution-20180722-
story.html. 
 169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2021).  
 170. Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-
carbon-fuel-standard/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 171. See id. 
 172. Klass & Henley, supra note 151, at 158–59.  
 173. Id. 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1), 7543(e)(2)(A) (2018). 
 175. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486.1 (2021); see also Apply for LCFS Fuel Pathway, CAL. AIR RES. 
BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/apply-lcfs-fuel-pathway (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 176. Lee & Duane, supra note 152, at 299–300. 
 177. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086–87, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2011), 
rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (Rocky Mountain I), 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 178. Rocky Mountain I, 730 F.3d at 1089.  
 179. Id. 
1336 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1313 
Nevertheless, a regulation is not facially discriminatory “simply because it 
affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”180 There must be “some 
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”181 The court found the 
CI score to be that other reason.182 In fact, the court noted that the lowest CI 
scores in ethanol had come from the Midwest and Brazil.183 The court held that 
the LCFS did not discriminate against interstate commerce because CI score, not 
location of origin, ran the program.184 As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded for the district court to apply the Pike balancing test.185 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed plaintiffs’ extraterritoriality claim. The 
district court had found the LCFS violated the doctrine of extraterritoriality,186 
because it feared that if every state adopted a lifecycle analysis of fuels, “the 
ethanol market would become Balkanized,” and inconsistent regulation would 
“cause significant problems to the ethanol market.”187 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, noting that the Fuel Standard does not require all firms or 
jurisdictions around the country to adopt the same standard; rather, anyone is 
free to enter the market in California so long as they meet the standard.188 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that California was not acting with a 
protectionist purpose because there was no special economic benefit to 
California.189 
The Ninth Circuit did go further by suggesting that it was paying special 
attention to the climate change context. The court recognized California’s 
interest in combating the effects of climate change—namely, the disappearance 
of its coastline, the difficulty on its labor force from rising temperatures, and the 
devastation of its farms from severe droughts. 190  An effective regulatory 
program “must not be so complicated and costly as to be unworkable.”191 
Moreover, the court stated that its decision was reinforced by the need for 
states to act as laboratories.192 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ concern that the LCFS 
would encourage other states to adopt similar but different legislation thus 
creating an unworkable mix and burden on interstate commerce, the Ninth 
Circuit said, “[i]f we were to invalidate [a] regulation every time another state 
considered a complementary statute, we would destroy the states’ ability to 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)). 
 182. Id. at 1090. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1089–90 (citing Chem. Waste v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)). 
 185. Id. at 1100–01. 
 186. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Rocky Mountain I, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Rocky Mountain I, 730 F.3d at 1101. 
 189. Id. at 1098–99. 
 190. Id. at 1097. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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experiment with regulation.”193  Addressing preemption, the court noted that 
“Congress of course can act at any time to displace state laws that seek to 
regulate the carbon intensity of fuels.”194 But since “Congress has expressly 
empowered California to take a leadership role as to air quality,” it seems that 
Congress has specifically endorsed California’s right to act as an experimental 
regulatory laboratory.195 
After remand, in Rocky Mountain II, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
plaintiffs’ renewed claims that the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause.196 Although the LCFS had undergone changes in the interim, the court 
found it contained the same core structure.197 Overall, the court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were largely precluded by Rocky Mountain I.198 Regarding 
extraterritoriality, the court again held that California is justifiably protecting its 
own resources from the onslaught of climate change.199 Specifically, it noted 
that the Commerce Clause does not prohibit regulations that “have upstream 
effects” on how out-of-state sellers who sell to in-state buyers produce their 
goods as extraterritorial regulation.200 
Since Oregon has followed suit, the next Subpart addresses how opponents 
sought a similar challenge to Oregon’s program and resulted in a similar 
outcome. 
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge to Oregon’s Air Pollution 
Programs 
In 2007, the Oregon Legislature created the Oregon Clean Fuels Program 
because “[g]lobal warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, 
public health, natural resources and environment of Oregon.”201 The program 
aimed to decrease lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels 
to at least ten percent lower than 2010 levels by 2025.202 A lifecycle emissions 
analysis—dubbed “well-to-wheels”—includes emissions from all stages of fuel 
production as well as direct and indirect effects such as those from crops to 
produce biofuels.203 Similar to California, the program established CI scores to 
fuels used in Oregon.204 
 
 193. Id. at 1105. 
 194. Id. at 1097. 
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In American Fuels and Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keefe, industry 
plaintiffs challenged Oregon’s program as violative of the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.205 The Ninth 
Circuit again followed the standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis. First, 
it addressed whether the program exhibited characteristics of facial 
discrimination. It held that the plaintiffs’ claims of facial discrimination were 
controlled by Rocky Mountain I because the Oregon program distinguished 
among fuels based on carbon intensity, not on origin.206 In fact, the court found 
that when the complaint was filed, twelve Midwest ethanols actually had lower 
CI scores than Oregon biofuels.207 
The court next addressed whether the program was discriminatory in 
purpose. It ultimately rejected plaintiffs’ argument that statements made by the 
former Governor of Oregon and various state legislatures proved that the state 
intended to “foster Oregon biofuels production at the expense of existing out-of-
state fuel producers.”208 The court reasoned that none of the statements cited 
suggested that the intent was anything other than the well-settled principle that 
states have a legitimate interest in combating the adverse effects of climate 
change to its residents. 209  The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the 
program’s credit and deficit system impermissibly burdened Midwest ethanols 
because, again, the fuels were based on CI score, not location.210 Moreover, 
there were out-of-state producers that fared better than in-state producers.211  
After finding no discrimination against interstate commerce, the court 
applied the Pike balancing test. The court noted that the plaintiffs did allege the 
program imposed “economic and administrative burdens on regulated parties” 
since importers of certain fuels either had to change the composition of the fuel 
they imported or purchase credits.212 However, the plaintiffs failed to plausibly 
allege that the burden was “‘clearly excessive’ in light of the substantial state 
interest” to decrease the environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions 
from transportation fuels.213 This further shows that even though there might be 
some sort of burden on out-of-state firms, that burden must be clearly excessive 
in relation to a state’s legitimate interest in combating the impacts of fossil fuels 
to that state. 
The court also found plaintiffs’ extraterritoriality claim barred by Rocky 
Mountain I because the Oregon program did not require any other jurisdiction 
 
 205. Am. Fuels & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 912. 
 209. Id. at 912–13 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007)). 
 210. Id. at 913. 
 211. Id. at 913–14 (“Under the Oregon program, producers of higher carbon-intensity fuels are disfavored 
relative to all lower carbon-intensity fuels, including those produced outside of Oregon.”). 
 212. Id. at 916 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981)). 
 213. Id. (quoting Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 473). 
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to adopt a particular standard for its producers to gain access in Oregon.214 
Furthermore, as in Rocky Mountain I, out-of-state producers needed only 
respond to the incentives of the program if they wished to gain market share in 
Oregon.215 
The dissent, however, would have found the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged 
discrimination in effects.216 Judge Smith distinguished this case from Rocky 
Mountain I because, in Rocky Mountain I, the decision went to the Ninth Circuit 
on a motion for summary judgment.217 American Fuels, in contrast, came to the 
Ninth Circuit on a motion to dismiss. Taking the facts alleged as true, Judge 
Smith indicated that in Rocky Mountain I the court found there was no virtual 
representation issue since in-state producers were potentially burdened more 
than out-of-state producers.218 Judge Smith was not entirely convinced that was 
the case under the Oregon program. Instead, he felt that Oregon’s CI program 
had managed to allow only in-state producers to generate a credit while only out-
of-state producers would generate deficits.219 He felt this was analogous to the 
virtual representation problem in West Lynn Creamery in that even though all 
producers were affected by the program, only out-of-state producers were 
burdened because of the deficits and their interests were not adequately 
represented by in-state producers because they received the credit.220  
As discussed in the next Part, these challenges to the California and Oregon 
programs act as lessons for state and local law makers seeking to enact 
environmental legislation. 
IV.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAWMAKERS 
Because of California’s longstanding contentious history in air pollution 
regulation, the following efforts in Oregon (once thought to be in less danger of 
the impacts of climate change),221 and the likelihood that other states will follow 
a similar path, the lessons learned from these cases are essential to the success 
of future state and local regulation. 
The Rocky Mountain I holding instructs state and local lawmakers to 
regulate in a similar way so that they may avoid invalidation for violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.222 Namely, there must be some reason, other than 
the mere fact that a fuel comes from another state for example, to show that the 
program does not discriminate against interstate commerce.223 Additionally, so 
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long as the program does not require another state to adopt a similar regulatory 
scheme, but rather requires out-of-state producers to comply with in-state 
regulations in order to obtain market share inside, such a result does not violate 
the doctrine of extraterritoriality.224  
One main lesson from American Fuels is that states should ensure that in-
state and out-of-state interests are sufficiently similar such that the in-state firms 
may effectively represent the out-of-state firms in the state legislative process.225 
As discussed in Rocky Mountain I, shaping a regulatory program which treats 
fuels differently depending on factors not entirely dependent on location of 
origin (for example, an all-encompassing lifecycle analysis like the CI score), 
may well be found to serve in-state and out-of-state producers equally.226 
It should be noted at the start that the state or local regulation should not 
outwardly discriminate against other states. The program should not be enacted 
for the purpose of protecting or to exclusively benefit the in-state economy. 
Doing so would subject the program to strict scrutiny, which is a sure-fire way 
for the program to be struck down as unconstitutional.227 To avoid this, the states 
should structure their program around something other than origin. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit found that because the fuel pathway in the California and 
Oregon programs were based on CI score instead of place of origin, the programs 
did not discriminate against interstate commerce.228 
So long as there is no outright discrimination against interstate commerce, 
the courts will apply the Pike balancing test.229 To pass that test, the lessons from 
Rocky Mountain I and American Fuels can be distilled to the following: (1) states 
have a right to act as a laboratory; (2) the program should not violate the 
principle of extraterritoriality by not requiring other jurisdictions to adopt the 
same program; and (3) the problem of virtual representation suggests the 
interests of out-of-state producers should be represented by in-state firms. This 
Part addresses these lessons. 
A. STATE AND LOCAL LAWMAKERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO ACT AS  
REGULATORY LABORATORIES 
States and local governments should rest assured that they have the 
judicially and congressionally confirmed right to act as a laboratory.230 So long 
as the programs do not result in economic Balkanization, states are free to do 
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their part to try novel experiments in an effort to protect themselves from the 
negative impacts of climate change.231  
Within the context of the Clean Air Act, Congress has encouraged 
California to “expand its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor 
vehicle emission standards different from and in large measure more advanced 
than the corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of laboratory 
for innovation.”232  This is a congressional endorsement that states try new 
regulatory programs. If successful, Congress may follow suit. Therefore, the 
local government does have the right—endorsed by Congress and the courts—
to protect its own resources and at the same time hope to provide an example for 
others.  
That being said, the courts have confirmed that this freedom comes with 
limitations.233 Plaintiffs challenging state and local environmentally protective 
statutes have used and likely will continue to use the extraterritoriality principle 
as a tool. While the line between extraterritorial regulation and acting as a 
laboratory for regulatory innovation is a thin one, the courts and Congress have 
specifically encouraged states to operate under the latter. The next Subpart will 
address how state and local lawmakers can walk this thin line. 
B. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE REQUIRES STATES TO PROTECT 
THEIR OWN RESOURCES 
The extraterritoriality principle is likely the most important lesson from 
these cases. In short, state and local lawmakers should avoid a program which 
essentially forces any out-of-state jurisdiction to adopt the same regulatory 
framework. There are two primary ways to avoid this. First, the lawmakers 
should structure their program as an open door to welcome out-of-state firms to 
participate in the state economy but with the condition that they satisfy certain 
requirements if they wish to do so.234 Second, the statute should clarify that the 
purpose of the program is to protect its own resources, not the environment as a 
whole.235  
One important lesson from the California and Oregon cases is that 
requiring out-of-state firms to conform to in-state standards is an entirely 
different beast than requiring other jurisdictions to adopt the same program.236 
California Governor Gavin Newsom’s recent decision to ban the sale of new gas 
cars in the next fifteen years is a prime example of a program with an open door 
to out-of-state producers.237 As in Rocky Mountain I, opponents will likely argue 
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that this restriction would require other states to adopt the same standard.238 
However, this goal does not require other states to adopt the same program. 
Rather, it is a signal to car manufacturers, for example, that they must conform 
to California’s requirements if they wish to sell cars in California.  
The other important lesson from the Ninth Circuit decisions is that 
lawmakers should make it painfully clear that the point of the climate change 
regulation is to protect the state’s own resources. The drafters of the Constitution 
indicated that the protection of its citizens is a right specifically reserved for the 
states.239 California acquired title to lands and waterways upon admission to the 
union as trustee of such lands.240  Since it is well settled that states have a 
legitimate interest in combating the effects of climate change,241 the state also 
has a legitimate interest in protecting its lands from the effects of climate change. 
After all, part of the initial motivation for the California waiver in the Clean Air 
Act was to allow Southern California to address its own poor air quality by 
regulating at a higher standard.242 
As the Ninth Circuit indicated in Rocky Mountain I, “[i]f GHG emissions 
continue to increase, California may see its coastline crumble under rising seas, 
its labor force imperiled by rising temperatures, and its farms devastated by 
severe droughts.”243 In Rocky Mountain II, the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
California legislature is rightly concerned about its citizens because they may be 
subjected to “crumbling or swamped coastlines, rising water, or more intense 
forest fires caused by higher temperatures and related droughts.”244 Drawing on 
this right, states and local governments must clarify that the regulation is meant 
to protect its own resources and not those outside its jurisdiction. 
The Ninth Circuit suggested that stating that the regulation is meant to 
protect the state’s own resources in the legislation itself may be enough to satisfy 
this requirement. The “Legislative Findings and Declarations” section of the 
LCFS states that “[g]lobal warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-
being, public health, natural resources, and the environment of California.”245 
Relying on that language, the Ninth Circuit held that “California did not enact 
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the LCFS because it thinks that it is the state that knows how best to protect 
Iowa’s farms, Maine’s fisheries, or Michigan’s lakes.”246 Rather, the court found 
that California had enacted the statute for the purpose of protecting its “own air 
quality, snowpack, and coastline.”247 To follow this direction from the court, 
states must make it clear that the regulations they enact are done for the purpose 
of protecting their own resources and not to encourage—or worse, require—
other states to adopt similar regulations to protect national resources. 
There is, however, a danger to this argument because the cause and effect 
of climate change is so attenuated.248 Opponents often argue that by “leading the 
way” on a national scale, the state or local government is attempting to regulate 
activities occurring entirely out of state in an effort to protect resources both 
inside and outside of its jurisdiction.249 The opponents’ argument is that simply 
stating its purpose is a mere pretext and therefore insufficient to withstand a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. However, courts have relied on the state 
legislature’s factual findings.250 In the case of California and Oregon, both are 
facing destruction from wildfires. 251  The federal government has been 
increasingly ignoring California’s cries for help, at least under the Trump 
Administration, despite the fact that nearly sixty percent of its forests is federal 
land. 252  Since the fires have resulted in burnt structures and lost lives, 253 
legislators should highlight these very real and drastic impacts in the legislative 
purpose. Because the states are attempting to protect their own citizens and 
resources, the regulatory programs will likely be upheld as constitutionally 
permissible. 
Since protecting its own resources is a substantial government interest, any 
sort of burden the regulatory program places on interstate commerce simply 
 
 246. Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d at 953. 
 247. Id. 
 248. This was a major point of contention during the constitutional standing inquiry in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–26. The EPA had argued that any remedy would be pointless since greenhouse gas 
emissions from other countries would likely “offset any marginal domestic decrease.” Id. at 523–24. The Court 
disagreed, holding a small incremental step is sufficient to establish standing in federal court. Id. at 524–26. For 
a detailed description of the petitioners’ strategy to address causation under constitutional standing, see Lisa 
Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENV’T L. 1, 13–16 (2008). Nevertheless, Massachusetts 
v. EPA was decided by a divided Court, and Chief Justice Roberts believed that this was incorrectly decided—
that causation and redressability are simply not met when the relief sought would only minutely address an issue 
of such global magnitude. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542–50 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Instead, he felt the 
Court had no role in such a political debate. Id. at 547. 
 249. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs submit . . . . that the purported goal is to combat global climate change . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Rocky 
Mountain I, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 250. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain II, 913 F.3d at 953. 
 251. California and Oregon 2020 Wildfires in Maps, Graphics and Images, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54180049. 
 252. Jim Lyons, Trump Blames California for Fires. He Should Check to See Whose Land They’re On., 
POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/09/15/trump-fires-california-
federal-land-415431. 
 253. California and Oregon 2020 Wildfires in Maps, Graphics and Images, supra note 251.  
1344 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1313 
must not be clearly excessive in relation to that interest.254 By highlighting the 
already drastic destruction of climate change in their own states, lawmakers will 
likely prove to a reviewing court that its program is meant to further a substantial 
government purpose.255 To ensure that this purpose does not place a clearly 
excessive burden on interstate commerce, the program would benefit from 
adequately representing out-of-state producers in the in-state legislative process. 
The next Subpart addresses how state and local lawmakers can achieve this by 
solving the problem of virtual representation. 
C. THE PROBLEM OF VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION REQUIRES OUT-OF-STATE 
PRODUCERS TO BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY IN-STATE PRODUCERS 
States should ensure that the program burdens out-of-state and in-state 
producers equally—or at least sufficiently similar such that the interests of the 
out-of-state firms are adequately represented by the in-state firms—in order to 
satisfy the principle of virtual representation. This puts the out-of-state firms’ 
remedy not in the courts, which would put the local regulatory program at risk 
of a court overturning it, but in the state legislative process.256 Moreover, to 
provide extra protection, states should clarify that the state (including in-state 
firms) is not reaping any financial benefit from the program. This will help to 
demonstrate that the state is not acting with a protectionist purpose.257 
Although the Supreme Court has shown some ambivalence to this 
principle, 258 courts have suggested that they may treat virtual representation 
differently in the climate change context.259 The Rocky Mountain I court at least 
found that the LCFS provided no economic benefit to the State of California.260 
In fact, it noted that evidence suggested the program ended up burdening one in-
state source at a higher percentage than benefiting it.261 The court reasoned that 
this burden on major in-state interests is exactly the type of safeguard against 
legislative abuse that the problem of virtual representation seeks to address.262  
Therefore, a state or local program would benefit greatly from ensuring that 
its program in one way or another burdens an in-state firm or product. This way 
the program is not acting with a protectionist purpose, which is the prime 
example of discrimination. Additionally, the in-state and out-of-state firms 
would be in the same boat, such that the in-state firm could also represent the 
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out-of-state firm’s interests.263 In that case, the out-of-state firm’s remedy would 
be in the state legislature instead of the courts.264 
Ultimately, the future of climate change regulation in the United States is 
uncertain. Judge Gould in the Ninth Circuit stated that the question of whether 
anthropogenic climate change exists is one for scientists to ponder; whether the 
world can fight it is one for economists and politicians to decide; and whether a 
state has the constitutional authority to do so is one for the courts to decide.265 
Nevertheless, the major questions doctrine and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent 
in Massachusetts v. EPA signal that the courts may remain completely removed. 
At least four Justices—Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—have strongly 
signaled that the issue, at least in the context of federal preemption, should fall 
squarely in the hands of Congress.266 As the scientific community comes closer 
and closer to agreeing that irreversible climate change persists at the hand of 
human activity,267 something has to give. So long as Congress fails to act, states 
and local lawmakers do have the constitutional authority to take a stand if they 
bear in mind the doctrines of extraterritoriality and virtual representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Chronic federal inaction to address the effects of climate change persists. 
States have invoked their constitutionally granted authority to provide for the 
general welfare of its citizens and stepped up to the plate. Parties negatively 
affected by the desire to divest from industries that perpetuate the problem have 
challenged these programs. Under the doctrine of preemption, such 
constitutional challenges have largely been successful. 
This Note argues that this success is attributed to two phenomena which in 
combination have proven difficult for the states to address. First, executive 
agencies tend to assert their authority to preempt state and local laws through 
administrative rulemaking. Second, the Supreme Court, through a series of 
doctrines, have consistently deferred to that executive agency’s decision. The 
probable demise of the latter will likely decrease prevalence of the former. 
Recent jurisprudence suggests that the new makeup of the Supreme Court puts 
those doctrines in jeopardy.268  Such change may well lead to the Supreme 
Court’s disinclination to defer to an agency’s preemption through administrative 
rulemaking, thus putting the onus back on Congress to decide whether or not a 
state or local law is preempted. 
If preemption becomes less of a concern, the states and local governments 
have an opportunity to enact more environmentally protective programs in their 
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desire to combat the effects of climate change. However, challenges under the 
dormant Commerce Clause will likely increase, and states must carefully draft 
environmental legislation to avoid the potential pitfalls of the doctrine. This Note 
suggests that, through analysis of two recent cases in the Ninth Circuit, the 
doctrines of extraterritoriality and virtual representation are likely to present the 
main difficulties. So long as states make it abundantly clear that the program is 
enacted to protect their own resources and that the program burdens in-state and 
out-of-state producers equally, the states should be in the clear to regulate 
climate change constitutionally. 
